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IN TH,E SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HARRY C. GREGUHN,
Plain ti//-Respondent,
-vs.MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE COMPANY and UNITED
BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants-A wellants

No. 11544

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to collect benefits for total and
permanent disability from two health and accident
insurance policies, which the Plaintiff-Respondent
had with the Defendants-Appellants Companies.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and
judgment for Plaintiff-Respondent, Defendant.sAppellants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Appellants seek reversal of judgment and for judgment in their favor as a matter of
law; or, that failing, a new trial; or, that failing, re\'ersal of that portion of the judgment awarding future benefits to Plaintiff-Respondent.
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 12, 1962, Plaintiff-Respondent, Harry
C. Greguhn, was insured under a Health and Accident policy, with the Defendant-Appellant, United
Benefit Life Insurance Company, and on May 8,
1964, was insured under a policy with DefendantAppellant, Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company.
Both policies basically involved health and accident
coverage. In both policies, and in his discharge from
the service, Plaintiff-Respondent gave his occupation
as being a brick contractor, and told the court ( R.
68) (T. 21) that he had built homes as a brick contractor "in the thousands."
Plaintiff-Respondent had had some serious
health problems prior to obtaining the policies with
the Defendants-Appellants companies. He was medically discharged from the service from Letterman
General Hospital in San Francisco, California, on
June 20, 1941, afer having been in the service for
only two months. Plaintiff-Respondent stated that
the reason for his discharge ( R. 78) ( T. 31 ) was "I
was a little too high strung." However he t.old Dr.
Tedrow (R. 151) ( T. 111) that the Army considered
him suicidal,, although he disagreed with this diagnosis. Plainfff-Respondent had also lost his right eye
in an industrial accident in 1943.
About a week prior to September 21, 1964, Plaintiff-Respondent was working on a scaffold as a brick
mason when a plank on the scaffold fell out from
underneath him and he fell against the wall with his
2
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belly and he ended up sitting on the other plank. (R.

;)5) (T.8).
On September 21, 1964, while working on the
same job, while employed by "\\r estern States Masonry, again on a scaffold, he experienced a plank fall
out from underneath him, caught himself with one
hand on the wall and the other hand on the scaffold.
( R. 56) ( T. 9). His employer lifted him up and put
him on the other plank and told him to sit there for a
while. About an hour or an hour and a half later,
his back began to bother him and he left work at 4 :00
o'clock (R. 57) (T. 10).
The following day the Plaintiff-Respondent saw
Dr. Robert Lamb, orthopedic surgeon, who, on examination, found that the Plaintiff-Respondent was
overweight with considerable increased lumbar lordosis or swayback (R. 86) (T. 39). PlaintiffRespondent weighed approximately 218 pounds. Dr.
Lamb took X-Rays which showed the Plaintiff-Respondent's back to have what Dr. Lamb called a pars
interarticularis defect at the L-5, S-1 level. Dr. Lamb
stated that this was in orthopedics language a spondy lolisthesis and "it's a defect between the articulations of the vertebral parts where they articulate
with the one above and the one below." This defect,
according to Dr. Lamb, might be either congenital or
acquired ( R. 87) ( T. 40). Dr. Lamb also found the
Plaintiff-Respondent to have degenerative disc disease in the remaining part of the lumbar spine, as
3
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well as arthritic changes. Dr. Lamb noted that Plaintiff-Respondent has considerable degenerative disc
disease and disc changes even in his neck. ( R. 97)
(T. 50).Dr. Lamb testified that there was no question, based upon the X-Rays taken on September 22,
1964, but that the spondylolisthesis existed prior to
the accident (R. 101) (T. 54), and that there was
also no question that the degenerative disc disease
existed prior to Plaintiff-Respondent's accident on
September 21, 1964.
Further, based upon the examination of September 22, 1964, Dr. Lamb felt that the PlaintiffRespondent, in addition to having the spondylolisthesis and degenerative disc disease, had received
some injury causing pressure on the nerve roots at
the lower lumbar level. ( R. 92) ( T. 45) . \\7th a spondy lolisthesis Dr. Lamb stated that there was a tendency of the vertebral bodies to slip back and forward
without any bony connection holding it, and if it
slides far enough it gets some stretch on the nerve
roots. (R. 88) (T. 41). Dr. Lamb further testified
on ( R. 93) ( T. 46) , "now as to whether he had any
more slippage after than before, one really can't say."
It was mostly an irritation. Dr. Lamb recommended
conservative treatment involving physical therapy
and the Plaintiff-Respondent continued to complain
of pain.
In October, 1964, Plaintiff-Respondent was hospitalized and on October 23, 1964, Dr. Lamb performed surgery on his back and fused the interverte4
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bral area between L-4 and S-1 of the sacrum. Plaintiff-Respondent continued to complain of back problems and on February 11, 1966, Dr. Lamb performed
a further surgery upon the Plaintiff-Respondent's
back, "which consisted of fusing the small amount
of motion between L-4 and 5, and also fusing the joint
between the third and fourth lumbar vertebra" (R.
96)(T.49).
The hospital record, Exhibit B-10 of the St.
Marks Hospital, indicates that the final diagnosis
after surgery in October, 1964 was: -1. Degenerative
disc disease lumbar and 2. Spondylolisthesis.
Plaintiff-Respondent was also hospitalized on
January 10, 1966, and the initial clinical impression
was: 1. Chronic or peptic gastritis and/or ulcer. 2.
Chronic back disease, not currently a problem. The
final diagnosis was peptic gastritis. (Exhibit P-7).
Dr. Lamb stated that several times he had advised the Plaintiff-Respondent to lose weight. (R.
102) ( T. 55). And to improve his abdominal strength.
Because of Plaintiff-Respondent's being overweight
and because he didn't improve his abdominal strength,
his back condition was aggravated and therefore he
couldn't participate in employment which would require stooping, bending or sitting or standing in any
position for a long time. ( R. 103) ( T. 56) .
Dr. Lamb stated that Plaintiff-Respondent had
received traction type injury, (R. 106) (T. 59), and
that his present symptoms, at the time of trial were
5
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caused by the degenerative changes in the remaining
part of his lumbar spine, together with the problem
of keeping his weight down. Dr. Lamb stated excessive weight is hard on the back and adds a little more
pain. ( R. 97) ( T. 50). Dr. Lamb further stated
that in the area of the spondylolisthesis which was
fused, the Plaintiff-Respondent is better than before
(R. 107) (T. 60) and that many of the PlantiffRespondent's problems were subjective and not clinically diagnosed. (R. 108). (T. 61). Dr. Lamb stated
that the pre-existing, degenerative disc disease and
spondylolisthesis, cooperating with the accident,
caused the pain and suffering for which the PlaintiffRespondent sought Dr. Lamb's help, and the preexisting conditions made him more vulnerable to
injury than "had he not had them." ( R. 108) ( T.
61 ).
Dr. Lamb further testified that the spondylolisthesis and degenerative disc disease was an independent agency already existing in the back at the time
he had the accident (R. 108)(T. 61), and that the accident didn't cause the spondylolisthesis or degenerative disc disease ( R. 109) ( T. 62). In answer to the
question: "But that because of these pre-existing conditions, the injured back was a favorable spot, cooperating in '[Xlrallel with the accident to cause him the
problenis which he has had since the accident?"
Dr. Lamb answered: "Yes." (R. 109) (T. 62). He
further testfied that if this accident hadn't triggered
the problem, then probably some other occurrence
6
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could have produced the same result. Otherwise,
Plaintiff-Respondent is in good health. (R. 110) (T.
63).
In giving his opinion as to whether or not the
accident that he described on September 21, 1964,
probably caused the disability, that he indicated, Dr.
Lamb would only say, ( R. 99) ( T. 52), "Well, according to this man's history, he had worked up until
that time, and I never felt that he should be released
to go back to that type of work. I don't think he will be
able to return to that type of work." Mr. Greguhn
had told Dr. Lamb that he was a brick mason.
In stating his opinion as to the cause of Plaintiff.
Respondent's disability, Dr. Lamb stated, "I think
that his disability is related to that accident." (R. 99)
(T. 52). Dr. Lamb further stated the previous existing spondylolisthesis and lumbar disc disease and the
arthritic changes in Plaintiff-Respondent's back have
a substantial importance in contributing toward his
disability. (R. 107) (T. 60). Dr. Lamb also stated
that the Plaintiff-Respondent could do sedentary
work.
The Plaintiff-Respondent denied being hospitalized for chronic or peptic gastritis and/or ulcer (R.
112) ( T. 65) , and also denied ever having been hospitalized prior to September 21, 1964. The Plaintiff.
Respondent admitted that there were some brick contractors who didn't actualy work on the wall ( R.
119) ( T. 72) and that he could use a telephone, could
7
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write, that he could walk up to about 50 feet without
using a cane, that he was not confined to house, and
in answer to the question if there were anything
about his condition which would prevent him from
figuring jobs, he said "Well, there are no jobs." ( R.
71) (T. 24). He stated that he enjoyed driving and
that it relaxed him.
Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, Orthopedic Surgeon, examined the Plaintiff-Respondent on August 20, 1965.
He found the Plaintiff-Respondent to have medically
bizarre symptoms in that the absence of atrophy or
signs of nerve damage didn't fit into the pattern of
nervousness, shaking, stumbling, and the type of loss
of control over his legs. (R 142) (T95). His examination indicated there was displacement of one centimeter of the lumbar bones with the upper part of the
sacrum (R 143) (T 96). He examined the X-Rays
taken on September 22, 1964 and it was Dr. Holbrook's opinion that the spondylolfthesis and lumbar
disc disease existed prior to the accident. ( R 155)
(T 108).

It was Dr. Holbrook's opinion (R 144) (T 97)
that the Plaintiff-Respondent had a 20% permanent
loss of bodily function as a result of t1;t.zondy1ilisthesis and lumbar disc problem and Ji accident,
and found his general health to be good (R 145) (T
98). Dr. Holbrook further testified that the Plaintiff-Respondent exhibited about 75% of what would
be normal motion for a man of his age and body build
( R 146) ( T 99). He further testified that the lack
8
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of motion in the lumbar area, based upon his tests
was a voluntary restriction (R 146) (T 99). Dr.
Holbrook testified that in his opinion the PlaintiffRespondent was not totally disabled for gainful employment. He testified that the Plaintiff-Respondent
was permanently disabled as a brick mason, working upon the line, handling the bricks and the mortar,
but that he was generally familiar with the physical
requirements of a building contractor engaged in
brick contracting where they were not required to
actually do the masonry work themselves, and that if
the Plaintiff-Respondent limited his physical work to
estimating and supervision, he was not totally and
permanently disabled from doing this kind of work.
(R 150) (T 103).
Dr. Jack L. Tedrow, Psychiatrist, also examined
the Plaintiff-Respondent on October 18, 1967. He
took a medical history from the Plaintiff-Respondent
and enquired as to the Plaintiff-Respondent's weight,
"because I felt that he was considerably overweight
for someone who complained of a bad back. He said
he weighed about 210 pounds. Dr. Lamb had asked
him to diet. Then he said 'Why should I diet? They
would then say I have some kind of sickness. They
are trying to pull everything under the sun.'* * * He
also told me that he felt that his doctor had been influenced against him by the insurance company, and
further that- * * * had fired two attorneys so far,
and kept on then with this hostile attitude in his discussion, finally saying that if he didn't get what he
9
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.rantcd frolll the Industrial Commission, he intended
to sue the Western States Masonry Company." (R
158) (T 111). Dr. Tedrow stated, (R 159) (T 112),
that the Plantiff-Respondent had no psychiatric
prnblems which would keep him from engaging in
his work as a bricklayer and brick contractor.
Dr. \Vallace E. Hess, 01thopedic Surgeon, examined the Plainiff-Respondent on September 26,
1967. Dr. Hess found the alignment of his spine to
be good, except for mild degree of lordosis, that is
sway back, which he attributed to obesity. PlaintiffRespondent could bend forward and reach to within
two feet of the floor with his fingertips. He did not
complain when doing this. He was able to squat down
onto his heels and back six times without difficulty.
(R 167) (T 120). The general examination was essentially normal. He moved about the office without
apparent difficulty. His nose was crooked from a
fracture as a child. ( R 168) ( T 121).
The X-Rays indicated a grade one spondylolisthesis and Dr. Hess found that the Plaintiff-Respondent in terms of loss of bodily function had a 20%
permanent partial impairment. ( R 169) (n22) It
was Dr. Hess's opinion that the spondylolisthesis existed prior to the accident which occurred on September 21 1964. It was also his opinion that the lumbar
disc disease existed prior td,.abcident on September
21,1964. (Rl60) (Tl23)
\Vhen Dr. Hess was asked what percentage of
disability he would assess to the pre-existing condi\ 1

10
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tion as opposed to the condition brought on or aggravated by the accident he stated "My opinion is
that perhaps 80 to 90% of the 20% would be preexistent". (R 171) (T 124)
He further testified ( R 172) ( T 125) the spondy lolisthesis and degenerative disc disease made the
Plaintiff-Respondent's back more susceptible to the
lllJUl'y.
Mr. William A. Morton Insurance Company investigator who performed a surveillance on the Plaintiff-Respondent testified as to the Plaintiff-Respondent's varied activities over a period of time and
stated that the Plaintiff-Respondent had no difficulty
driving on the freeway and in maneuvering the Chrysler Impe1·ial which he was driving while it was being
pushed by a Ford Fairlane in a circle to get it started.
(R 176) (T 129)

Mr. John R. Richards local manager of the Defendants-Appellants Companies testified that all
benefits as called for by both insurance contracts
were paid under the accident and sickness provisions
except for total and permanent disability from accident alone. The pertinent provision in the Mutual of
Omaha Policy is :
r

"Total Loss of Time' * * * also means
that period of time during which you are unable to engage in any other gainful work or
service for which you are reasonably fitted
by education, training or experience."
11
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And under Part "A":
" 'Injuries' means accidental bodily injuries received \vhile this policy is in force
and resulting in a loss independently of sickness and other causes."
And in the case of the United Benefit policy, under
Part "A":
"The term 'Loss of Time' * * * means
that period of time for which the insured is
unable to perfonn none of his occupational
duties." * * *
And in the insuring clause, the policy holder is insured
"against loss of life, limb, or sight resulting directly and independently of all other
causes from accidental bodily injuries received
while this policy is in force." * ;, *
Mr. Richards testified that the Defendants-Appellants had paid a total of $2,346.66 in benefits and
that he, personally, explained the rehabilitation provisions of the Mutual of Omaha Policy. Mr. Greguhn,
the Plaintiff-Respondent, indicated to Mr. Richards
that he did not wish to discuss rehabilitation in view
of the fact that the Industrial Commission of the
State of Utah had not yet concluded their findings
on his loss. (R 185) (T 138).
The jury found the issues in favor of the Plaintiff-Respondent and against the Defendants-Appellants on a general verdict, and the jury was dismissed. The Court, having previously ruled that Defendants-Appellants had repudiated or renounced
12
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the Con tract ( R 50) ( T 3), then determined the
amount of future damages based upon Exhibit 15
by multiplying the life expectancy of a male person
of Plaintiff-Respondent's age times the yearly benefits under the contracts, discounted to present value.
O\'er the Defendants-Appellants' objection, the Court
ente1·ed judgment in the sum of $49,225. 78, representing $15,018.00 for past amounts due, up to the
time of trial and $34,207.03 for future payments.
(R 195) (T 148), (R 196) (T 149)
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO
THE JURY.
In order for the Plaintiff-Respondent to recover, under the language of the policy, it was necessary that: First, he be totally disabled; and secondly, that the disability result from the accident
alone, exclusive of all other causes. There was not
sufficient evidence on either of these propositions to
submit the case to the jury.
The applications for both policies of insurance indicated that the Plaintiff-Respondent was a brick
contractor. The Application for insurance became
part of the contract and therefore, the DefendantsAppellants insured the Plaintiff-Respondent as a
brick contractor in the usual sense of this profession.
Therefore, in order for Plaintiff-Respondent to be
13
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entitled to payment under the Mutual of Omaha policy it is necessary that the Plaintiff-Respondent be
unable to engage in any other gainful work or service for which Plaintiff-Respondent was reasonably
fitted by education, training or experience as a brick
contractor, and under the United Benefit Policy it
means that the Plaintiff-Respondent is able to perform none of his occupational duties as a brick contractor. The Army discharge of the Plaintiff in June
1941, (Exhibit D-8), also indicates that he was, by occupation, a brick contractor. The Plaintiff-Respondent indicated that he knew of brick contractors who
did not work on the wall (R 119 (T 72) and when
asked if there was anything about his condition
which would prevent him from figuring jobs, his
answer was, "Well there are no jobs." (R 71)
( T 24). In addition, there was no medical evidence
to the effect that Plaintiff-Respondent could not
work as a brick contractor, providing he limited his
activities to sedentary work. In fact, Dr. Holbrook
testified that if he limited his work to estimating
and supervising, he was not permanently and totally
disabled, and both Dr. Holbrook and Dr. Hess, as of
the time of their examinations, found that he only
had a 20% permanent loss of bodily function as a result of the spondylol~thesis lumbar disc problem and
the accident. ( R 144) ( T 97).
The Plaintiff-Respondent told Dr. Hess ( R. 166)
(T. 119) that he could sit in his car and drive all day
and this was the only enjoyment he gets.
14
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Dr. Tedrow testified that there was no reason,
from a psychiaritic standpoint why the PlaintiffRespondent could not continue engaging in his work
as a bricklayer and a brick contractor (R. 159) (T.
112).
The inference from the testimony is that the
Plaintiff-Respondent did not wish to work. In fact
he had not worked from the date of the fall. He had
pursued benefits under the policies with the Defendants-Appellants companies. He had pursued benefits
under Social Security and Workman's Compensation.
When the rehabilitation provisions of the contract
were discussed with him, by Mr. Richards, he indicated that he did not wish to pursue the rehabilitation
because the Industrial Commission of the State of
Utah had not made their findings in his case, ( R.
185) ( T. 138), presumably because he felt his case
would be prejudiced if he went back to work.
His medical discharge, his bizarre symptoms, as
testified to by Dr. Holbrook, indicating an absence
of atrophy or sign of nerve damage ( R. 142) ( T. 95)
together with his statements of suspicion that his
physician, Dr. Lamb, had been influenced against
him by the insurance companies, and his refusal to
diet or strengthen his belly muscles, indicated that he
did not wish to cooperate in going back to work. Indeed, his statement to Dr. Tedrow (R. 158) (T. 111)
"Why should I diet? They would then say I have
some kind of sickness. They are trying to pull every15
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thing under the sun," indicates his lack of desire to
cooperate and is indicative of his attitude. This was
born out by his own doctor, Dr. Lamb, who stated
that (R. 108 (T. 61) many of the Plaintiff-Respondent's problems are subjective and not clinically diagnosed.
The review of the extent of his activities by Mr.
William A. Morton who had him under surveillance,
indicated that Plaintiff-Respondent carried on a substantially normal range of activities and he appeared
to be able to do substantially all that he wished to do.
(R.174) (T.127), (R.175) (T.128), (R.176)
(T. 129), (R.177) (T. 130), (R. 178) (T. 131).
Plaintiff-Respondent's own physician, Dr. Lamb,
testified that the spondylolisthesis and degenerative
disc disease was an independent agency already existing in the back at the time of the accident. (R. 108)
(T. 61). He further testified (R. 109)(T. 62) that
because of the pre-existing condition, the injured back
was a favorable spot, cooperating in parallel with the
accident to cause him the problems which he has had
since the accident, and that if this accident hadn't
triggered the problem, very probably some other occurrence could have produced the same result ( R.
110) ( T. 63 ) .
Dr. Hess testified that in terms of percent, that
it was his opinion, (R. 171) (T. 124), that 80 to 90%
of the 20% of Mr. Greguhn's loss of bodily function
would be pre-existent. Both of these conditions were
16
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neither inactive, quiescent, nor dormant. They were
progressive and getting worse. Dr. Hess found the
spondylolisthesis to be grade 1. (R. 169) (T.122).
Dr. Holbrook testified that as of the date of his
examination, the Plaintiff-Respondent exhibited
about 75% of what he would consider normal motion
for a man of the Plaintiff-Respondent's age and body
build. ( R. 146) ( T. 99) .
Plaintiff.Respondent's own physician testified
that the spondylolisthesis and degenerative disc disease was an independent agency already existing in
the back at the time of the accident and caused the
problems for which the Plaintiff-Respondent sought
Dr. Lamb's treatment. (R. 108)(T. 61).
Dr. Lamb also stated: "Question: But that because of these pre-existing conditions, the injured
back was a favorable spot, cooperating in parallel
with the accident to cause him the problems which
he has had since the accident?" Answer: "Yes."
(R. 109) (T. 62).
The Plaintiff-Respondent denied that he had
been previously bothered by his back condition. This
statement should be considered in light of other statements he made. For example: He said that he never
consulted any doctors for any condition or diseases
and that he enjoyed wonderful health and he had no
problems of any kind he knew about (R. 54) (T. 7).
He forgot to tell about having a broken nose as a
child, being in Letterman General Hospital and being
17
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discha1·ged from the hospital and from the United
States Army after only two months in the service,
and denied being hospitalized for chronic or peptic
gastritis and/ or ulcer ( R. 112) ( T. 65), though the
hospital records were admitted into evidence (Exhibit P. 7).
The final diagnosis sheet, in connection with the
surgery, performed the following month after the
accident, clearly states what Plaintiff-Respondent's
health problem was:
1. Degenerative disc disease lumbar
2. Spondylolisthesis
and makes no reference in the diagnosis to the accident.
The degree to which a previous condition is symptomatic prior to an accidental injury does not determine from a legal sense or medical sense whether it
was in fact present. To say that if the previous existing conditions were not bothersome, they were not
legally there, no matter how fatal or debilitating
medically, is grossly unfair to the insurer. For example: An insured's body may be full of unknown
and asymptomatic cancerous growths of terminal
consequences, and death may follow soon after a
slight injury, but the immutable fact is that the
cause in fact of the death was the cancer, or the cancer and the injury, and not the injury, exclusive of all
other causes.
A summary of the Plaintiff-Respondent's health
problems include the broken nose as a child, psycho18
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logical problems, spondylolisthesis, degenerative disc
disease, arthritic changes and gastritis and/or ulcers
and the loss of one eye. Unfortunate as they are, the
long train of consequences of all of these health problems should not end up legally as a result of a fall of
a short distance involving traction type injury when
he caught himself by his arms. To permit the jury
under the Court's instructions to find that this injury
is the legal cause of his present condition, and that
this condition is in effect totally and permanently
disabling from gainful employment as a brick contractor, is error.
The Court, in overruling Defendants-Appellants'
Motion for a Directed Verdict, at the end of the evidence, stated, (R. 188) (T. 141) that he was considering this case to be bound by the rule of Lee vs.
New York Life Insurance Company, 95 U. 445, 82
P.2d 178, rather than the language of Browning vs.
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States, 94 U. 532, 72 P.2nd 1060. The Court, in the
Lee case, at page 179, states the rule as follows:
"Where an accidental injury sets in motion or starts activity of a latent or dormant
disease and such disease contributes to the
death after having been so precipitated by the
accident, the disease is not a direct or indirect
cause of the death, nor a contributing cause
within the meaning of the terms of the policy,
but the accident which started the mischief,
and precipitated the condition resulting in
death is the sole cause of death."
The significant language is, "sets in motion, or
19
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starts." It is Defendants-Appellants' contention in
the instant case that Plaintiff-Respondent's fall
neither started nor set in motion the spondylolisthesis or degenerative disc disease.
Justice Wolfe in his dissent in the Browning case,
distinguishes the Lee case from the Browning case,
by stating that in the Browning case, the infection
or toxhnia was operating in parallel, rather than in
series, as in the Lee case. As Justice Wolfe notes, if
this is not a valid differrence, the only case which
apparently would not be covered by the policy would
be where the course of the chain leading from the injury and the course of the chain leading from the
other cause, be it disease, toxemia, or what not, were
shown to be entirely separated, without any interaction, one with the other. If this is so, the language
in the policy "independent of all other causes" has
been judicially read completely out of the policy.
Assuming, without admitting that as Mr. Greguhn stated, the back condition was asymptomatic
prior to the injury, this cannot be controlling.
The actual efficient cause was that the lumbar disc
disease and spondylolisthesis were two causes which
were grinding away, doing their mischief, had been
doing so for many years prior to the accident, and
continued to do so afterwards. Dr. Lamb noted the
disc changes even in Mr. Greguhn's neck. ( R. 97)
(T. 50). The grinding was inexorable. It was irreversible. It was continuous. It was in parallel. ( R.
108) (T 61).
20
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The stage was set. The actors were already
present. At most, all the accident did was raise the
curtain.
The spondylolisthesis and degenerative disc disease were not produced, nor set in motion by the injury.
Notice how similarly the language of Dr. Lamb
(R. 108) (T. 61) was to the language of Justice
vVolfe concurring in Lee vs. New York Life, supra,
explaining that the difference is whether the preexisting condition and accident are hooked together
in parallel or in series:
"The causes are linked together in series,
-the accident causing the injury, the injury
causing the diffusion of an infection, and the
infection causing the appendicites and the appendicites causing death. This is not the
Browning Case, where the course of the injury
was one thing which simply set the stage,
whilst the toxemia, an independent, crusading
agency, already there, not produced nor set in
motion by the injury, but simply using the injured part as a favorable spot for its operation,
therefore operating not in series but in parallel, was the efficient, paramount and independent cause of the prolonged inability."
The principles of law enunciated in the previous
Utah cases are followed in the most recent case,
Thompsen vs. American Casualty Co., 439 P.2nd276,
20 U.2nd 418. The primary issue in this case again
was whether or not the Plaintiff-Respondent's disability was a result of accidental means, as provided
21
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under the terms of the instll'ance contract. The trial
court in granting the summary judgment held that
it was not. The Supreme Court remanded the matter
for trial stating that a question of fact had been
raised which foreclosed granting of summary judgment. The Court also said:
"A second issue, to be determined by the
trier of the facts, is whether Plaintiff's physical disability resulted from accidental means
directly and independently of all other causes.
As previously observed, Plaintiff had certain
infirmaties and disabilities prior to his sustaining his state of alleged complete physical
disability. It is Defendant's contention that
even if Plaintiff's disability were the result
of accidental means, he was suffering from
prior disabilities which cooperated with the
alleged accident; and, therefore, the accident
cannot be considered the sole cause or a cause
independent of all other causes of his disability." Citing White vs. National Postal Transport Association, 1 U.2nd 5, 261 P.2nd 924;
Lee vs. New York Life Insuram,ce Co., 95 U.
445, 82 P.2nd 178; Tucker vs. New York Life
Insurance Co., 107 U. 478, 155 P.2nd 173."
The case at bar is more similar to Tucker vs.
New York Life, 155 P. 2nd 173, 107 U. 478. In this
case the diseased condition had so weakened the aorta
of the Plaintiff, decedent, that it could not stand the
increased blood pressure occasioned by the insured's
fall and the resulting dissection of the aorta, causing
the insured's death. It was held that the insured's
death did not result from bodily injury effected solely
22
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through external, violent and independent cause within the double indemnity provision of a life policy.
The Court, in the Tucker case, supra, reiterated
the distinctions as follows, at page 175:
"The courts, in interpreting the clause
in insurance policies like that here involved,
to-wit: An injury effected through violent,
external, and accidental means, entirely independent of all other causes, have made three
distinctions or classes of cases: ( 1) When
an accident causes a diseased condition which,
together with the accident, results in the injury or death complained of, the accident alone
is to be considered as the cause of the injury
or death." Ci ting cases. " ( 2) When at the time
of the accident, the insured was suffering from
some disease, but the disease had no causal
connection with the injury or death resulting
from the accident, the accident is to be considered the sole cause."
The appellants in this case contend that it falls
within the third category:
" ( 3) When at the time of the accident,
there was an existing disease which, cooyerating with the accident, resulted in the mjury
or death, the accident cannot be considered as
the sole cause, or as the cause independent of
all other causes." Citing cases.
The Defendants-Appellants contend that under
the facts of this case, no reasonable minds could differ
on the point that there was existing diseases which
cooperated with the accident and therefore cannot be
considered as the sole cause or as a cause independent
of all other causes.
23
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POINT NO. II
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT
DID NOT CORRECTLY STATE THE
LAW.
The Court did not adequately instruct upon the
Plaintiff-Respondent's theory of the case.
The Instructions of the Court, in effect, re-wrote
the contract.
The Instructions of the Court emphasized what
Plaintiff-Respondent had done in terms of employment, more than what he can do.
The Court failed to instruct that it would be
necessary to find both that the Plaintiff-Respondent
was totally and permanently disabled and from the
accident alone, independent of other causes, as set
forth in Requested Instruction No. 1.
The Court failed to properly instruct upon Defendant-Appellants' theory of the case as set forth in
the Defendants-Appellants' Requested Instructions.
The Court refused to give the DefendantsAppellants' proposed Instructions Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7
and 8.
The Instructions did not cover all of the issues.
In Requested Instruction No. 3, DefendantsAppellants requested the Court to instruct that in
accordance with the provisions of the terms of both
policies, that benefits are not payable for mental disease or disorder. There was evidence in the record
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that Plaintiff-Respondent was discharged from the
Army because of mental disorders, and Dr. Lamb
testified that many of his problems were subjective
( R. 108) ( T. 61 ) and Dr. Holbrook testified that the
absence of atrophy or sign of nerve damage was medically a bizarre symptom. ( R. 142) ( T. 95).
The jury, from this evidence could, under proper
instructions, make an inference that Mr. Greguhn
was totally disabled because of attitude, rather than
physical condition. Since mental disease or disorders
are not covered under either policy, Mr. Greguhn's
disability for this reason would be excluded from
coverage. To be entitled to benefits under the policy,
Mr. Greguhn would have to be totally disabled from
accident, not from a combination of accident and/or
mental disorder and/or spondylolisthesis and/or degenerative disease and/or arthritic changes. Defendants-Appellants were entitled to have the jury instructed upon the issue of mental disease or disorder
and failure to do so was prejudicial.
The Court's Instruction No. 12 was an attempt
to define "latent" or "dormant." The Court said:
"Latent and dormant, as used in these
instructions, mean powers or qualities that
have not yet come into sight or into action,
but may, and suggest inactivity."
The jury could not properly, under this Instruction,
from the evidence, find that Mr. Greguhn's condition
of spondylolisthesis and lumbar disc disease were
25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

latent and dormant. The X-Rays taken on September
22, 1964 showed that the pre-existing conditions had
come into sight and were active and were not dormant. Dr. Lamb, Dr. Holbrook and Dr. Hess who saw
the X-Rays all concurred.
Instructions Nos. 14, 15 and 17 are defective and
prejudicial. Instruction No. 14 states:
"Total and permanent disability in this
case means that the Plaintiff has a condition
which disallows him from f ollowng his occupation and from doing substantially all the acts
that are necessarily and usually performed by
one who follows that occupation."
This Instruction is defective because it is objective
in nature. Instructions 15 and 17 apply the same
standard and are defective for the same reason. They
attempt to instruct on what others do, rather than
placing the emphasis upon that which Mr. Greguhn
can do. They are further defective because they depart from the language of the policies. The language
of the Mutual of Omaha policy is subjective in nature
and states under "Total Loss of Time":
"It also means that period of time during
which you are unable to engage in any other
gainful work or service for which ymt are
reasonably fitted by education, training or
experience."
The same defect applies to Instructions 14, 15 and
17. The Rule, as stated in Instructions 14, 15 and 17
is contrary to public policy, because it encourages in26
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sureds to not try to become gainfully employed. This
is the reason Mr. Greguhn refused rehabiltation
for feai· it would prejudice his Industrial Claim. It
places a premium on disability rather than on ability.
The test should be as stated in the Contract, "gainful
work or service for which you are reasonably fitted
by education, trainng or experience."
In defining the language in the Mutual of Omaha
Policy and Instructions 16 and 17, the Com't expands
and redefines the language in the Contract, and in
effect makes a new contract for the Parties. For the
courts to continue to make new contracts for the insurance company, works a hardship on those seeking
insurance. In order to compensate for the expanded
meaning of the policies, premiums must be computed
with the increased liability in mind, and, as Justice
\Volfe points out in Browning vs. Equitable Li/e Assurance Society, supra, at page 1071:
"and makes it more difficult for persons
of ordinary means who need to be protected
against the hazards of accidents, rather than
sickness, from obtaining such protection.
Moreover, it makes it more difficult or impossible for known sick people to obtain accident policies."
Further, Justice Wolfe noted, at page 1072:
"In this case the existing toxemia attacked an impaired part. It existed independently
of the injury. The causes are hooked up in
parallel and not in series. The insurer contracted to pay for disabilities solely caused by
27
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an accident and not a disability caused by the
localization of toxemia in the body not caused
by the accident but which beset the part because the accident has presented the opportunity."
The result reached in this case is that the insurer is
required to pay an indemnity for the possession of a
spondylolisthesis and a diseased disc condition, rather
than an indemnity for disability totally accident
caused.
POINT NO. III
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
AN AWARD FOR FUTURE DISABILITY UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY BREACH.
In the pleadings, and all through the trial and
now, both Defendants-Appellants admitted the validity and binding effect of both policies of insurance.

v 5,

Both of the policies in the instant case, required
the submitting of continuing proofs of loss. To hold
that an anticipatory breach of an insurance contract,
with an absolute and unequivocal renunciation of
liability under it, permits an action upon the entire
contract as a matter of anticipatory breach and makes
a new contract for the Parties. In the case of Erreca
'[JS-. Western States Life Insurance ComTJ<lny, Cal.,
121P.2nd689, the Court stated:
"In a literal sense no one knows whether
disability is permanent until the death of the
insured, and a disability which at the outset
appears to be of lasting and indefinite dura28
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tion may be in fact otherwise. Accordingly,
in many cases it was held that the insured's
probable physical recovery from a totally disabling illness defeated his claim for total and
permanent disability benefits."
In the case of Colovos vs. Home Life Insurance
Co. of New York, 83 U. 401, 28 P.2nd 607, the Court
stated the rule correctly:
"As a general rule of law, where an insurance contract is involved, you cannot include
in the judgments sums not yet payable under
the contract, and the court should have instructed the jury that recovery is limited up
to the time of the filling of the amended complaint."
The Colovos case, supra, is quoted in the annotation which appears at 99 ALR 171, with those cases
holding to the view that the right of action is limited
to accrued installments, together with the view that
action lies upon the entire contract are annotated
therein.
It would seem that in the instant cast, the rule
set forth in the Colovos case is applicable. In the
Colovos case, supra, the Court said that the error in
not instructing the jury that the recovery was limited
up to the time of the filing of the amended complaint,
was not reversible error because the Plaintiff in his
complaint and amended complaint asked for recovery
only up to the time of filing of the complaint.
A number of Western States seem to follow the
rule set forth in the Colovos case, supra:
29
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Trompeter vs. United Insurance Company,
Wash., 1957, 316 P.2nd 455.
Univ. Life and Accident Insurance Company
vs. Saunders, Texas, 102 SW 2nd 405.
Lane vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive Enginemen and Firemen, Oregon, 1937, 73 P.2nd
1396.
Smith vs. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident
Association, Oklahoma, 1933, 10 F.S. 110.
Mid-continent Life Insurance Company vs.
Walker, 260 P. 1109, California
Cobb vs. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 51
P.2nd 84
Erreca vs. Wes tern States Life Insurance Co.,
121 P.2nd 689.
The Trial Court in this case, ruled that there had
been a repudiation or renunciation of the contract
provisions and ruled that testimony relative to a lump
sum payment for future benefits would be admissible
(R. 50) (T. 3). The Court so ruled, despite the fact
that in Defendants-Appellants' Answers, (T3a), the
Defendant-Appellant, United Life Insurance Company stated:
"Answering paragraph 3 of said Complaint, Defendant admits the issuance of the
insurance policy referred to in said Complaint,
and alleges affirmatively that the only payments for which the Defendant did become o~
ligated would be in accordance with the terms
and provisions of the policy."
In the Answer of the Mutual of Omaha Insurance
Company, that Defendant-Appellant stated:
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"Answering paragraph 3 of said Complaint, Defendant admits that the policy numbered 76DLSE 385336-64M issued and alleges
affirmatively that Defendant agreed to pay
the benefits in accordance with the provisions
of the policy."
During the trial, both Defendants-Appellants admited that they were bound under the policy and that
both Defendants-Appellants agreed to pay benefits
in accordance with the provisions of the policy, and
the Defendants-Appellants still admit responsibility
under the policies.
In New York Life Insurance Company vs. Viglas,
297 U.S. 672, 56 S. Ct. 615, 80 L. Ed. 971, it was
held that refusal in good faith of an insurer which
had contracted to pay benefits and waive premiums
on a life insurance policy during the total disability
of the insured, to pay further benefits on the ground
that the insured had ceased to be totally disabled, such
refusal to continue the policy in force, unless the premiums were paid, did not constitute a repudiation of
the policy, or constitute such a breach of its provisions as to make additional and future benefits a
measure of recovery and permit the recovery of damages in excess of benefits in default at the time of
the action. In order for the doctrine of anticipatory
breach to apply, there must be a repudiation or renuciation, or prevention of performance.
See 17 Am. Jur. 2nd, Secs. 449, 450, 451, under
Contracts
See Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 318
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There has been no breach of contract policy by
the Defendants-Appellants.
In 44 Am. Jur. 2nd, Section 1598, page 486, it
states:
"A substantial number of authorities have
adopted the view that in case of the breach of
contract by an insurer, to pay periodic indemnity of benefits, the right of action is limited
to the installments which have accrued to the
date of the action, or if the complaint is amended to include the installments accruing during
the pendency of the action, to those which have
accrued prior to the judgment and that the
judgment cannot be rendered in favor of the
insured for the installments not accrued at
such time."
Among the cases cited in the footnote are:
Erreca vs. Western State Life, 212 P.2nd 689,
141ALR18
Fanning vs. GuardUin Life Insurance Co., 59
Wash. 2nd 101, 366 P.2nd 207
In the same section of 44 Am. J ur. 2nd, at page
487, it states:
"It has been held, however, that an insurer's refusal to continue total disability benefits
upon the ground that the insured was not in
fact totally disabled, does not amount to such
a repudiation and breach as to make conditional and future benefits the measure of recovery.
It has also been held that an insurer's refusal
to ,;>ay a claim for disability benefits under a
pohcy providing for monthly benefit payments
for total and permanent disability, but providing for termination of benefit payments if the
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insured ceased to be disabled during that period, on the ground that medical investigation
showed that the insured was not disabled within the meaning of the policy, does not constitute a repudiation of the policy so as to entitle
the insured, upon establishing disability within the meaning of the policy, to recover judgment for unmatured instalments upon the
ground of anticipatory breach of the contract."
As to the use of the life expectancy of the insured, the same text states:
"On the other hand, if an action to recover
future instalments may not be maintained,
the expectancy of life of the insured does not
enter into the question of the insurer's liability
for the instalments which have accrued, and
if there has been no anticipatory breach by the
insurer, the courts do not favor adopting as
the measure of damages the expectancy of life
of the insured."
POINT NO. IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN TAKING
AWAY FROM THE JURY THE DETERMINATION OF THE LIFE EXPECTANCY OF THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
Assuming, without admitting that the trial court
did not err in graning an award for future disability,
based upon the entire contract and the life expectancy
discounted to the present values, the finding of fact
as to how long Mr. Greguhn would have lived, is a
finding of fact for the jury to make. In jury trials,
the jury is sole trier of the fact. They were entitled
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to determine whether the insured, with all of his
health problems would have lived the same years, less
or more than the mortality tables for a man of Mr.
Greguhn's sex and age.
In this case, the trial court merely made a mathamatical computation based upon the life expectancy
of a person of Mr. Greguhn's age and sex.
CONCLUSION
The Defendants-Appellants respectfuuly urge
this Court to reverse the Order of the trial court to
the effect that there was sufficient evidence to submit this case to the jury; and that this court direct
that judgment be entered for the Defendants-Appellants.
In the event that this Court holds that the trial
court did not err in submitting the case to the jury,
that a new trial be granted because of error in law
in the instructions given by the trial court, and because of the failure of the trial court to submit to the
ju1-y for a finding on the issue of fact of the PlaintiffRespondent's life expectancy.
Should this court find that there was sufficient
evidence to submit the case to the jury and that there
was no error in law, the Defendants-Appellants urge
this court to reverse the trial court as to that portion
of the judgment entered for future damages and require that the Plaintiff-Respondent receive monthly
34
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benefits upon submitting the proper proofs of medical
disability as called for by the policies.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES E. FAUST
Attorney for Deferul.antsAppellants.
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